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Consumer Counter-Advertising Law and
Corporate Social Responsibility
ALBERTO R. SALAZAR V.†
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression is a fundamental constitutional
value. In the marketplace, both corporations and consumers
are deemed to have freedom of expression. However,
consumer expression may not be as strongly protected as
corporate expression. In particular, the law of defamation
often imposes unnecessary limitations on consumer
expression. As a result, reputation and expression collide
and the courts are called on to strike a reasonable balance
between these values. Canadian courts tend to favor the
protection of reputation over expression, thereby
discouraging greater consumer expression and counteradvertising practices. This not only affects free expression
itself, but also eliminates the social and economic
advantages of having vibrant and responsible consumers.
Specifically, chilling consumer expression may erode the
possibility that consumers may supervise and control
corporate activity through the exercise of their freedom of
expression in the marketplace. The lack of responsible
consumer counter-advertising practices may facilitate
corporate social irresponsibility. In areas such as public
health and healthy eating, such irresponsibility coupled
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with passive consumers may have a negative impact on the
battle against obesity and hunger in society.
This Article discusses the legal protection of consumers’
freedom of expression as a form of counter-advertising and
explores its implications for enhancing corporate social
responsibility in Canada. While the Charter of Rights
(“Charter”) does not apply to private parties, courts are
supposed to develop the common law in a manner that is
consistent with the fundamental Charter values such as
freedom of expression. Yet, courts have traditionally favored
the protection of reputation over expression by setting
stringent standards for the use of defenses against
defamation suits. This has chilled consumer expression,
counter-advertising practices, and, more generally,
consumer activism, worsening the situation of consumers
already compromised by the lack of anti-SLAPP legislation
in Canada. Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada
introduced a new defense, ‘responsible communication on
matters of public interest’, which represents major progress
towards reducing the chilling effects of the common law of
defamation. The defense requires that the communication
be on a matter of public interest and be made responsibly.1
It will be argued that when applied to consumer expression,
there is still the danger that the standard of diligence
required by the new defense may be too high for ordinary
consumers and small consumer groups, thereby reinstating
the chilling effects on expression and reinforcing both
consumer apathy and legal bias against potentially active
non-affluent citizens. It is desirable that the application of
such a standard is responsive to the real conditions of
ordinary consumers.
Such flexible application of the consumer expression
defense is important because it will enhance the search for
truth, public debate, and democratic governance of the
market. In particular, facilitating consumer expression and
counter-advertising increases the availability of noncorporate information and the degree of democratic
deliberation in the marketplace. It also creates an
important oversight mechanism, namely, consumer
supervision of corporate activity through counteradvertising, which is likely to enhance the social
responsibility of corporations. In the area of food
1. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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consumption and healthy eating, the presence of consumer
counter-advertising improves the level of legal and social
control over aggressive food advertising and growing
corporate self-regulation of food advertising, which are often
unfriendly to healthy eating. As a result, both the
democratic regulation of advertising and the fight against
obesity may benefit from a stronger legal protection of
consumer expression.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I reviews the
Charter’s protection of consumer expression, consumer
counter-advertising, and the common law of defamation in
Canada. It notes that, despite the efforts to correct the
chilling effects on freedom of expression, the law of
defamation sets out uncertain and costly standards that
discourage free expression, thereby in practice favoring the
protection of reputation over freedom of expression. It then
discusses the new defense against defamation. It will be
argued that the standard of diligence that the new defense
requires may be too stringent for individual consumers and
small consumer groups. Part I thus concludes that it is
desirable to avoid this problem in order to encourage
consumer expression. Part II examines the implications of a
flexible application of the new defense to consumer
expression, focusing on corporate governance and corporate
social responsibility. It will be claimed that a flexible
application of the defense of ‘responsible communication on
matters of public interest’ will ultimately facilitate
consumers’ supervision of corporate activity and, hence, will
promote corporate social responsibility. Part II concludes
with a brief analysis of the application of this claim in the
area of food advertising and the fight against obesity and
unhealthy eating.
I. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, CONSUMER COUNTERADVERTISING LAW AND DEFAMATION IN CANADA
A. Charter Protection of Consumer Counter-Advertising
Counter-advertising has received some protection in
Canadian law. The Supreme Court of Canada has already
recognized the value of consumer counter-advertising and
has granted it constitutional protection as a form of freedom
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of expression.2 Section 2 of the Charter thus protects
consumer counter-advertising in the same way that
commercial expression is granted constitutional protection.3
Consumers also have the constitutional right to express
their views of or disappointments in a product or service,
even to the extent that they can engage in consumer
activism in the marketplace.4
In R. v. Guignard, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt
with an appeal by a consumer who was convicted for
erecting a sign on one of his buildings expressing his
dissatisfaction with the services of an insurance company.5
When Mr. Guignard, the consumer, refused to take the sign
down, the respondent charged him with contravening
section 14.1.5(p) of the City of Saint-Hyacinthe’s planning
by-laws, which prohibited the erection of advertising signs
outside an industrial zone.6 The Municipal Court convicted
him, finding that the by-law prohibited the type of sign
erected and that, although this prohibition infringed upon
his freedom of expression as guaranteed by section 2(b) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it was
justified by section 1 of the Charter.7 The Superior Court
and the court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of the
by-law.8 The Supreme Court of Canada, however, allowed
the appeal and held that section 14.1.5(p) and the definition
of the words “enseigne” (sign) and “enseigne publicitaire”
(advertising sign) in section 2.2.4 of the by-law were
invalid.9 The Court held, inter alia, that the impugned bylaw was not justifiable under section 1 of the Charter,10 and
stated that it “severely curtailed [Mr.] Guignard’s freedom
to express his dissatisfaction with the practices of his
insurance company publicly.”11 In its opinion, the Supreme
2. R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 2002 SCC 14 (Can.).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 476.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 477-78.
8. Id. at 478.
9. Id. at 489.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 488.
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Court stated that consumers’ constitutional right to freedom
of expression also involves the right to counter-advertising:
On the other hand, consumers also have freedom of expression.
This sometimes takes the form of “counter-advertising” to criticize
a product or make negative comments about the services supplied.
Within limits prescribed by the legal principles relating to
defamation, every consumer enjoys this right. Consumers may
express their frustration or disappointment with a product or
service. Their freedom of expression in this respect is not limited
to private communications intended solely for the vendor or
supplier of the service. Consumers may share their concerns,
worries or even anger with other consumers and try to warn them
against the practices of a business.12

This constitutional right of consumers may comprise
diverse means of expression. The forms that counteradvertising may take should be broad enough to allow
consumers to express their views. The Supreme Court
recognized the problem of the limited financial capacity of
consumers, and has thus allowed them to use multiple
affordable means of expression that effectively convey their
views to the public.13 This can be particularly empowering
for consumers with limited financial resources. The Court
clearly approved a large number of inexpensive forms of
expression to tackle the problems of affordability and
effectiveness of the means of consumer counter-advertising:
[S]imple means of expression such as posting signs or distributing
pamphlets or leaflets or, these days, posting messages on the
Internet are the optimum means of communication for
discontented consumers. The media are still often beyond their
reach because of the cost. In Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), this
Court stressed the importance of signs as an effective and
inexpensive means of communication for individuals and groups
that do not have sufficient economic resources. Signs, which have
been used for centuries to communicate political, artistic or
economic information, sometimes convey forceful messages. Signs,
in various forms, are thus a public, accessible and effective form of
expressive activity for anyone who cannot undertake media
campaigns.

12. Id. at 484.
13. Id. at 485.
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. . . A limitation of this nature can in fact deprive that person
of the only means of expression that are truly accessible to him or
her.14

This to some extent tackles the financial and
informational barriers that prevent consumers from
exercising their right to freedom of expression. The cost of
consumer access to the media is often prohibitive. In
Guignard, the Supreme Court of Canada noticed that
problem and allowed consumers to use diverse means of
expression.15 However, the Court held that view in the
context of government-citizen relations, and its application
may be limited to consumer counter-advertising in
connection with government interference. At best, the
constitutional protection of consumer counter-advertising
only creates a legal incentive and does little to facilitate the
actual exercise of freedom of expression. This right may
mean little for consumers if they do not possess the
resources to finance their acts of expression. The holding of
rights requires the holding of capabilities, including the
necessary financial capabilities,16 which are often unequally
distributed.17 Overcoming these barriers to consumers’
freedom of expression can be particularly empowering for
low-income and minority consumers, as they have become a
large section of the obese population and are often targeted
by the food industry in their advertising campaigns.18 For
instance, the legal protection of ordinary consumers who
use the Internet as a medium to express their opinions
about food choices and food corporations’ practices helps
14. Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
15. Id.
16. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
17. See Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 233
(1993) (referring to the problem of lack of resources).
18. See, e.g., Kim D. Raine, Determinants of Healthy Eating in Canada: An
Overview and Synthesis, 96 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 3) S8, S10-11
(2005) (“Increasingly, the food industry targets marketing messages at young
children, perhaps in recognition of their vulnerability to such messages
associated with underdeveloped critical consumer conscience.”); Andrea
Freeman, Comment, Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 2221, 2237-38 (2007) (“Fast food companies have devoted considerable
resources to developing marketing strategies aimed specifically at African
Americans and Latinos, and it appears that the investment reaps a significant
reward.”).
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mitigate the financial barriers to counter-advertising.19
Similarly, the constitutional protection of food consumer
picketing, boycotting, and leafleting—either by directly
persuading fellow consumers not to buy at the place of
purchase or through leaflets delivered to the mailbox,
placed in newspaper advertisements, sent via email, or
plastered on billboards and posters—creates opportunities
for inexpensive methods of expression.20
However, this constitutional protection of consumer
counter-advertising has not had a significant impact. The
Guignard case involved a government action where the
Charter clearly applied to protect the expression of the
consumer against interference by the government. In
contrast, the Charter is widely believed not to apply in
private party litigation where the government is not
involved in the restriction of free expression.21 This deprives
consumers’ expression of constitutional protection when
they have to litigate against private corporations.
Nevertheless, while the Charter does not apply to
private litigants relying on the common law and where no
act of government is involved, the courts ought to apply and
develop the principles of the common law in a manner
19. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 919, 945-46 (2000) (claiming that the
most effective means in the United States for countering the chill of libel suits
against ordinary citizens who use the Internet as a medium of expression is the
opinion privilege, namely, the privilege for statements that do not imply
assertions of objective facts).
20. See R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Can. Beverages (W.) Ltd., [2002]
1 S.C.R. 156, 172-73, 2002 SCC 8 (Can.); U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. Kmart Can.
Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083, 1103 (Can.) (“The distribution of leaflets and posters
is typically less expensive and more readily available than other forms of
expression. As a result, they are particularly important means of providing
information and seeking support by the vulnerable and less powerful members
of society.”); Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 764 (Can.)
(“In holding, in RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., . . . that secondary picketing
was a form of expression within the meaning of s[ection] 2(b) the Court
recognized that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression extended
to expression that could not be characterized as political expression in the
traditional sense but, if anything, was in the nature of expression having an
economic purpose.”); Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, [1998] 39 O.R.3d
620, 648 (Ont.) (“[T]here is no reason, in logic or in policy, for restraining a
consumer boycott.”).
21. R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 603 (Can.).
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consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the
Constitution and, in particular, the Charter.22 The Charter
values should be weighed against the principles that
underlie the common law.23 The development of the common
law must therefore reflect the fundamental Canadian value
of the right to free expression enshrined in section 2(b) of
the Charter.24 Thus, the fundamental value of freedom of
expression should inform the common law in dealing with
issues of consumer counter-advertising. Furthermore, the
argument for the Charter’s application to private disputes
involving consumer expression becomes stronger where this
expression has a public character or relates to a very
important public issue.25
Indeed, courts have already recognized that the
common law should protect consumer expression. In
Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, the Ontario court
dismissed an action brought by an international corporation
for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants’
consumer boycott activities.26 The company, Daishowa,
negotiated a forest management agreement giving it logging
rights over disputed lands.27 A native band claimed right to
the land, and wished to block logging until aboriginal land
rights had been settled.28 The defendant group, the Friends
of the Lubicon, was a small public interest group based in
Toronto that initiated a public boycott campaign of
Daishowa’s paper products.29 The group contacted
customers of the company and organized informational
22. See, e.g., WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, 421, 2008 SCC
40 (Can.); Pepsi-Cola Can., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 167; Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2
S.C.R. at 603.
23. Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1171
(Can.).
24. Pepsi-Cola Can., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 167.
25. See, e.g., B.C.G.E.U. v. B.C. (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, 24748 (Can.); Daishowa, 39 O.R.3d at 647; see also Chris Tollefson, Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Developing a Canadian Response, 73
CAN. BAR REV. 200, 228-29 (1994) (arguing that the Charter may apply to
SLAPPs given their public nature).
26. Daishowa, O.R.3d at 621.
27. Id. at 625.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 626-27.
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pickets at locations where Daishowa’s customers refused to
join the boycott.30 For example, the defendants, as
consumers, picketed at Pizza Pizza outlets in hopes that
their fellow consumers would persuade Pizza Pizza to join
the boycott by not buying the company’s pizzas.31 The court
stated that this type of consumer expression deserved
protection equal to the protection afforded to corporate
expression. The court held that:
[M]y conclusion is that if the Canadian Constitution protects a
corporation’s expression where the context is largely economic, and
where one of the consequences of the expression, if accepted by the
listener, might well be economic harm to competitors, then the
common law should not erect barriers to expression by consumers
where the purpose and effect of the expression is to persuade the
listener to use his or her economic power to challenge a corporation’s
position on an important economic and public policy issue. The plight
of the Lubicon Cree is such an issue, as is Daishowa’s connection to
it.32

The court concluded that consumer boycotts and
picketing are forms of commercial expression and should be
protected by the Charter.33 The court found that unlike
corporate expression, the public interest served by
consumer expression is a ground for applying the Charter
and
granting
constitutional
protection
to
those
expressions.34 In this case, for example, the defendant group
was not motivated by economic self-interest, but instead by
a desire to disseminate information about a very important
public issue.35 Accordingly, it was not unlawful for the
defendant group to express itself in a picketing context in
order to enlist consumers in a boycott of the company’s
products. The presence of a clear public element in a private
dispute thus justifies the application of the Charter. In
R.W.D.S.U. v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages, the Supreme
Court also held that picketing, including consumer boycotts
30. Id. at 627.
31. Id. at 632-33.
32. Id. at 649.
33. Id. at 647-48 (“[T]here is no reason, in logic or in policy, for restraining a
consumer boycott.”); see also R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2
S.C.R. 573, 574 (Can.).
34. Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, [1998] 39 O.R.3d 620, 647 (Ont.)
35. Id. at 649.
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unrelated to labor disputes, always involves expressive
action.36 Accordingly, “it engages the high constitutional
value of freedom of expression enshrined in s[ection] 2(b) of
the Charter.”37
While the common law is supposed to develop in a way
that is consistent with fundamental Charter values, courts
have favored the protection of reputation over expression
when deciding defamation lawsuits.
B. The Common Law of Defamation and the Lack of AntiSLAPP Legislation
Consumer counter-advertising nevertheless has limits.
It is generally lawful unless it involves tortious or criminal
conduct. Consumer counter-advertising should not exceed
the limits imposed by defamation laws. Consumers should
not engage in defamatory acts that intentionally seek to
damage the commercial reputation of corporations. In
Guignard, for example, the Supreme Court held that
counter-advertising should not exceed the limits imposed by
the legal principles of defamation.38 Similarly, in Daishowa,
the court noted that, while consumer picketing and boycotts
may be lawful, expressions containing false statements or
grossly unfair accusations of genocide, interpreted according
to their plain and ordinary (or usual and common) meaning,
are defamatory.39 It is important to note, however, that
economic loss alone is insufficient to support a common law
defamation claim.40 An enterprise may suffer economic loss
as a consequence of properly conducted consumer boycotts,
36. R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Can. Beverages (W.) Ltd., [2002] 1
S.C.R. 156, 170-72, 2002 SCC 8 (Can.).
37. Id. at 173.
38. R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 484, 2002 SCC 14 (Can.); cf. Home
Equity Dev. Inc. v. Crow, 01/4472, [2002] B.C.J No. 1805 QUICKLAW, at paras.
13-14 (B.C.S.C. July 30, 2002) (holding that the burden is on the applicant in a
PPPA action to show that the plaintiff’s suit was improper if the plaintiff
established a prima facie defamation claim). The European Court of Human
Rights has recently reiterated this defamation limit on consumers’ expressions.
See Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 36.
39. Daishowa, 39 O.R.3d at 659, 663.
40. U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. Kmart Can. Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083, 1113
(Can.).
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picketing, or leafleting efforts.41 In particular, sound
consumer boycotts and picketing are lawful activities and do
not constitute a tort.42
In attempting to strike a balance between freedom of
expression and the protection of reputation, courts have
been inclined to favor the latter. The law of defamation
rests upon a form of no-fault liability.43 Accordingly, the
plaintiff must:
[E]stablish only three things to make out a prima facie cause of
action, namely, that the words complained of (1) are reasonably
capable of defamatory meaning; (2) refer to the plaintiff; and (3)
have been published. Liability does not rest upon proof that the
statement complained of was untrue or . . . that the defendant was
at fault in publishing those words. Nor does the plaintiff have to
prove damages. The common law presumes falsity, fault and
damages.
Justification, or truth, is a defence to a defamation action.
However, as defamatory words are presumed to be false, the
defendant bears the onus of proving the substantial truth of the
sting, or the main thrust, of the defamatory words. It is no defence
for the defendant to show that it followed accepted standards of
investigation and verification and formed an honest and
reasonable belief in the truth of statements it [communicated].44

Another defense frequently invoked is the fair comment
defense. This defense:
[R]ests upon the defendant establishing that the statement was
(1) a comment, not a statement of fact; (2) based upon true facts;
(3) on a matter of public interest; (4) made fairly; and (5) made
without malice. . . . As with the defence of justification, however
thoroughly the [defendant] may have researched the story and
checked its sources, if the facts upon which the opinion is based
cannot be proved to be true, the defence of fair comment will be of
no avail.45

41. Id.
42. Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, [1998] 39 O.R.3d 620, 650 (Ont.)
(discussing the tort of interference with economic interest).
43. Cusson v. Quan, [2007] 86 O.R.3d 241, 251 (Ont.).
44. Id. at 251-52.
45. Id. at 252.
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All these difficulties render the defenses against
defamation largely ineffective, which in practice results in
over-protecting reputation. Indeed, in Cusson v. Quan, the
Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that “[i]n its traditional
formulation, the common law of defamation clearly favors
the protection of reputation over freedom of expression.”46
This is extremely problematic as it chills open debate on
matters of public interest. As the Supreme Court of Canada
has stated:
[T]he traditional elements of [the] tort [of defamation] may
require modification to provide broader accommodation to the
value of freedom of expression. There is concern that matters of
public interest go unreported because publishers fear the
ballooning cost and disruption of defending a defamation action.
Investigative reports get “spiked,” [it is contended], because, while
true, they are based on facts that are difficult to establish
according to rules of evidence. When controversies erupt,
statements of claim often follow as night follows day, not only in
serious claims (as here) but in actions launched simply for the
purpose of intimidation. Of course “chilling” false and defamatory
speech is not a bad thing in itself, but chilling debate on matters
of legitimate public interest raises issues of inappropriate
censorship and self-censorship. Public controversy can be a rough
trade, and the law needs to accommodate its requirements.47

Consequently, the Supreme Court of Canada has
attempted to correct the problems with the common law of
defamation. In WIC Radio v. Simpson, the Supreme Court
interpreted the fair comment defense so as to make it
consistent with the Charter values underlying freedom of
expression and reputation.48 Recognizing the chilling effects
of defamation suits on freedom of expression and public
debate, the Court modified the fair comment defense,
seeking to strike a better balance between free expression
and reputation. The modified test states that:
46. Id. at 252-53. However, the court also notes that “the common law does
recognize that in certain situations, protection of reputation must yield to open
and free discussion. These occasions attract the protection of either absolute or
qualified privilege. Words spoken in Parliament and in the courts attract
absolute privilege.” Id.
47. WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, 437-38, 2008 SCC 40
(Can.).
48. Id. at 421.
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(a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the
comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can
include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comment; (d)
the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any
person honestly express that opinion on the proved facts; (e) even
though the comment satisfies the objective test [of honest belief,]
the defence can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the
defendant was subjectively actuated by express malice.49

The defendant must prove the four elements of the defense
before the onus switches back to the plaintiff to establish
malice.50 With respect to the fourth element, the objective
honest belief test “represents a balance between free
expression on matters of public interest and the appropriate
protection of reputation against damage that exceeds what
is required to fulfill free expression requirements.”51
While the Court appears to have strengthened the
protection of freedom of expression, WIC Radio falls short of
neutralizing the chilling effects of the common law of
defamation. The low threshold for establishing prima facie
defamation was not altered. The common law presumptions
of falsity, fault, and damages are unchanged. The onus still
lies with the defendant to raise an affirmative defense—
such as truth, privilege, or justification—many of which set
high standards that defendants can rarely meet without
considerable expense. Raising this threshold would have
made it tougher for plaintiffs to bring a defamation suit and
thereby to intimidate potential defendants. In this respect,
it is still relatively easy for plaintiffs to bring an action for
defamation, and the threat of litigation is likely to chill free
expression. Similarly, as LeBel explained in his partially
concurring judgment, the objective honest belief
requirement places a reasonableness restriction on the
opinions a person may legitimately express.52 Courts have
often been “uncomfortable with the idea of limiting fair
comment to what is reasonable . . . .”53 Furthermore,
commentators have noted that:
49. Id. at 443.
50. Id. at 455.
51. Id. at 453.
52. Id. at 466 (LeBel, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 474.
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It is difficult to discern the presence of an objective honest belief
prior to pleading the defence of fair comment at trial. The
practical effect of the ambiguity generated by the honest belief
requirement is that it dampens the effectiveness of the fair
comment defence in neutralizing the chilling effect on expression
created by the spectre of a defamation lawsuit.54

Needless to say, the need to prove the elements of such
a test in a court setting increases litigation costs that
defendants bear and further chills free expression.
Moreover, defamation laws have been used strategically
to intimidate and silence consumers’ expressions of concerns
and criticisms of products or corporate practices. This
strategic use of defamation law is known as Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”). SLAPP
suits are very much a part of Canadian society, and the
courts are cognizant of their negative effect on public
participation and consumers’ freedom of expression.55 The
list of SLAPP suits involving corporate retaliation against
Canadian consumers is fairly large.56 Yet, Canada lacks
anti-SLAPP legislation. The only attempt to introduce antiSLAPP legislation was British Columbia’s 2001 Protection

54. Matthew Shogilev, Thawed but Still Chilled: Freedom of Expression in
the Aftermath of Simpson v. Mair, THE COURT, July 16, 2008,
http://www.thecourt.ca/2008/07/16/thawed-but-still-chilled-freedom-ofexpression-in-the-aftermath-of-simpson-v-mair/.
55. While some Canadian courts have emphasized the use of SLAPP suits
against governmental participation, SLAPP suits should also encompass suits
that limit consumers’ right to commercial speech. See Fraser v. Saanich [1999]
32 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 143, 151-52 (B.C.) (“A SLAPP suit is a claim for monetary
damages against individuals who have dealt with a governmental body on an
issue of public interest or concern. It is a meritless action filed by a plaintiff
whose primary goal is not to win the case but rather to silence or intimidate
citizens who have participated in proceedings regarding public policy or public
decision making.”). U.S. courts have clearly adopted a definition that
encompasses SLAPP suits that can “effectively limit citizens’ First Amendment
rights to free speech.” See Kentner v. Timothy R. Downey Ins., Inc., 430 F.
Supp. 2d 844, 845-46 (S.D. Ind. 2006); Dickens v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,
11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 882 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2004).
56. SUSAN LOTT, PUB. INTEREST ADVOCACY CTR., CORPORATE RETALIATION
AGAINST CONSUMERS: THE STATUS OF STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION (SLAPPS) IN CANADA 13-36 (2004), http://www.piac.ca/
consumers/corporate_retaliation_against_consumers.
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of Public Participation Act, which was repealed shortly after
enactment.57
Procedural barriers further prevent the protection of
consumer counter-advertising from corporate SLAPP suits.
Further, the use of possible defenses may be difficult and
costly to substantiate in a court setting. For instance, the
defenses of fair comment, qualified privilege, and prospect
of no success of the libel lawsuit introduced by the shortlived BC 2001 Protection of Public Participation Act58 were
of no significant help to consumers, as consumers were not
able to establish these claims during the litigation process.59
One of the major difficulties that consumers experience is
the inability to prove the truthfulness of their statements
due to significant financial impediments and lack of access
to critical information.60 The high damage awards faced by
consumers who are unable to prove their claims
substantially deter future consumer expression and
counter-advertising.61
The intimidation effect of libel lawsuits may be very
effective in silencing consumer expression.62 The
disciplinary and censorship power of libel lawsuits may take
several forms. The threat of defamation lawsuits and the
likelihood of facing expensive legal fees may dissuade
consumers from continuing with the expression of their
concerns and the communication of counter-information
57. 2001 S.B.C., ch. 32 (B.C.) (repealed 2001).
58. Id.
59. See e.g. Home Equity Dev. Inc. v. Crow, 01/4472, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1805
QUICKLAW, at paras. 64, 69 (B.C.S.C. July 30, 2002).
60. Id. at paras. 70-71.
61. See Home Equity Dev. Inc. v. Crow, 01/4472, [2004] B.C.J. No. 177
QUICKLAW, at para. 182 (B.C.S.C. Feb. 3, 2004).
62. During the past three decades, the legal community has documented
hundreds of cases in which corporations misused the courts by filing Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs. See John C. Barker,
Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 395, 400 n.18, 403 (1993); Sharlene A. McEvoy, “The Big Chill”: Business
Use of the Tort of Defamation to Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment
Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 503, 503-04 (1990); D. Mark Jackson, Note,
The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPS: Revisiting New York
Times v. Sullivan, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 491 (2001) (arguing that
defamation suits brought by corporations should be subject to liability as SLAPP
actions).
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regarding questionable corporate practices. When this
initial threat succeeds, consumers are compelled to retract
their comments, change the public statement of their
opinions, deliver a public apology, or even cancel public
forums dedicated to raising consumer awareness.63 If the
initial threat fails, libel lawsuits force consumers to face
corporate plaintiffs in court who are prepared to sustain
lawsuits until the final ruling or drop cases strategically
when intimidation or exhaustion is accomplished.64 These
lawsuits jeopardize and misallocate the limited financial
resources of consumers, divert consumer attention from
monitoring consumer markets, and limit consumers’ ability
to publicize their criticism. According to one victim:
[T]hey were successful in diverting our attention from the forest to
the courts. All fundraising efforts after being sued went to the
court related costs (transportation, legal costs, etc) instead of the
forest protection campaign. Also, our lawyer advised us that the
seven of us should no longer talk to the media, so the SLAPP
lowered our media presence too.65

Perhaps one of the most prominent and relevant
Canadian cases in the area of food consumption was the
2002 campaign launched by the Living Ocean Society to
discourage the consumption of farmed salmon and
encourage consumers to look at other salmon hues.66 The
industry groups threatened the Society with a defamation
action, effectively forcing the Society to remove some
imagery from the campaign materials to avoid an expensive
legal battle.67
It is thus desirable to reinstate anti-SLAPP legislation
in Canada to prevent the strategic use of defamation laws to
silence consumer expression. For instance, the defenses
against defamation lawsuits introduced by the short-lived
BC 2001 anti-SLAPP legislation should be given fresh
legislative consideration.68
63. LOTT, supra note 56, at 27-30.
64. See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (discussing the Repap New Brunswick lawsuit).
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. at 28.
67. Id.
68. This type of legislation has been widely adopted in the last decade. See,
e.g., Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action: Bringing and Defending Anti-
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Public pressure on the courts and legislatures to
eliminate the chilling effects of the common law of
defamation on freedom of expression continues to grow, and
calls for reinstating anti-SLAPP legislation in Canada
continue to increase. Recently, in Grant v. TorStar, the
Supreme Court of Canada introduced a new defense against
defamation suits—‘responsible communication on matters of
public interest’—that is supposed to strike a better balance
between the protection of freedom of expression and
reputation.69 The defense only requires that the publication
be on a matter of public interest and be made responsibly:
The proposed change to the law should be viewed as a new
defence, leaving the traditional defence of qualified privilege
intact.
....
. . . [F]irst, the publication must be on a matter of public
interest. Second, the defendant must show that publication was
responsible, in that he or she was diligent in trying to verify the
allegation(s), having regard to all the relevant circumstances.
....
In determining whether a publication is on a matter of public
interest, the judge must consider the subject matter of the
publication as a whole. The defamatory statement should not be
scrutinized in isolation.
....
To be of public interest, the “subject matter must be shown to be
one inviting public attention, or about which the public, or a
segment of the public, has some substantial concern because it
affects the welfare of citizens, or one to which considerable public
notoriety or controversy has attached.”
Public interest is not confined to publications on government
and political matters, nor is it necessary that the plaintiff be a
“public figure . . . .”
SLAPP Motions to Strike or Dismiss, 22 CAUSES ACTION 2d 317 (2003)
(highlighting U.S. states that have promulgated anti-SLAPP statutes); see also
California Anti-SLAPP Project, Other States: Statutes and Cases,
http://www.casp.net/menstate.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
69. Grant v. TorStar, 2009 S.C.C. 61, 32932, [2009] S.C.J. No. 61
QUICKLAW (Dec. 22, 2009).
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....
The judge decides whether the statement relates to a matter of
public interest. If public interest is shown, the jury decides
whether on the evidence the defence is established, having regard
to all the relevant factors, including the justification for including
defamatory statements in the article.70

Once a statement is determined to relate to the public
interest, the following criteria are used to evaluate whether
the publisher of the statement was diligent in trying to
verify the allegation:
(a) the seriousness of the allegation; (b) the public importance of
the matter; (c) the urgency of the matter; (d) the status and
reliability of the source; (e) whether the plaintiff’s side of the story
was sought and accurately reported; (f) whether the inclusion of
the defamatory statement was justifiable; (g) whether the
defamatory statement’s public interest lay in the fact that it was
made rather than its truth (“reportage”); and (h) any other
relevant circumstances.71

The defense of responsible communication is available
to anyone, not just journalists and traditional media:
A second preliminary question is what the new defence should
be called. In arguments before us, the defence was referred to as
the responsible journalism test. This has the value of capturing
the essence of the defence in succinct style. However, the
traditional media are rapidly being complemented by new ways of
communicating on matters of public interest, many of them
online, which do not involve journalists. These new disseminators
of news and information should, absent good reasons for
exclusion, be subject to the same laws as established media
outlets. I agree with Lord Hoffmann that the new defence is
“available to anyone who publishes material of public interest in
any medium.”72

It follows that an individual or group that posts a
message, text, or report, for instance, on the Internet
regarding a matter of public interest should be able to
invoke this defense. In particular, consumers can use the
defense to protect their expressions and opinions in the
70. Id. at paras. 95, 98, 101, 105-06, 128.
71. Id. at para. 126.
72. Id. at para. 96 (citation omitted).
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marketplace. This expands the Charter’s protection of
consumer expression as stated by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Guignard.73 It is then possible to infer that the
responsible communication defense, when applied to the
market and consumer behavior, may translate into a public
interest responsible consumer defense. In terms of
commercial expression and advertising, this defense offers
significant legal protection to consumer counter-advertising
practices. In the absence of anti-SLAPP legislation, such
defense against defamation suits has the potential to
neutralize the chilling effects of the common law of
defamation on freedom of expression.
The application of this defense in the area of consumer
expression, however, raises some concerns. The second
aspect of this defense requires that the publication is
responsible, that is to say, the defendant is “diligent in
trying to verify the allegation(s), having regard to all the
relevant circumstances.”74 If the defense is available to
anyone, including consumers, one may wonder if the
standard of diligence should be different for individual
consumers and consumer associations. The question is
important because, unlike for-profit corporations, individual
consumers often lack the time, resources, and legal
knowledge necessary to make sure that their expressions
and critical opinions meet legal standards or escape liability
for defamation.75 It is difficult to imagine that all ordinary
consumers will be in a position to know and understand the
legal requirements for the use of the defense without paid
legal advice. Even so, not all ordinary consumers have the
resources, time, and knowledge to comply, for example, with
the requirements of seeking the plaintiff’s side of the story
and confirming the reliability of sources before they
73. R v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 484, 2002 SCC 14 (Can.).
74. Grant, at para. 98 (QUICKLAW).
75. Jennifer Meredith Liebman, Defamed by a Blogger: Legal Protections,
Self-Regulation and Other Failures, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 343, 365
(noting that, in some cases, victims of online defamation have greater resources
to pursue legal action than defendant bloggers). Similar concerns have been
raised with respect to freedom of expression in the United States. See Tamara
R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583,
2617 (2008) (“[O]ne might plausibly argue that the current state of affairs is
imbalanced in favor of corporate speech even without expansive First
Amendment protection for commercial speech simply on the basis of the
disparity of resources available.”).
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communicate their views and opinions to the world. In fact,
this legal exercise is likely to chill consumers’ expression, as
they may fear both the possibility of not meeting the
standard and the prospect of engaging in expensive
defamation litigation.76 Only affluent consumers will
probably feel confident relying on the defense and
communicating their opinions. Small consumer groups and
underfunded consumer associations may face similar
challenges and, as a result, be deprived of their right to
express their views and disseminate information on matters
of great importance to the public. While it is desirable that
consumers adhere to a standard of diligence, a stringent
standard may render the defense of responsible
communication ineffective in the marketplace for most
consumers.
Therefore, it is desirable that the standard of diligence
is not set too high for individual consumers or small
consumer groups in order to make the defense truly
available to these groups. The standard of diligence that the
new defense requires should be sensitive to the limited
resources, time, and knowledge that ordinary consumers
confront on a daily basis. In requiring that consumers verify
the allegations, consideration should be given to what is
practically possible for ordinary consumers within the
constraints of time, resources, and knowledge, while taking
into account the problems of consumerism, consumer
apathy, inequality, and cultural diversity. This approach is
consistent with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s view in
Grant. In Grant, the Court held that the standards to
evaluate conduct of non-journalists should not be the
journalistic standards:
A review of recent defamation case law suggests that many
actions now concern blog postings and other online media which
are potentially both more ephemeral and more ubiquitous than
traditional print media. While established journalistic standards
provide a useful guide by which to evaluate the conduct of
journalists and non-journalists alike, the applicable standards will
necessarily evolve to keep pace with the norms of new
76. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized this general problem with the
common law of defamation before Grant. See WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008]
2 S.C.R. 420, 437, 2008 SCC 40 (Can.) (“There is concern that matters of public
interest go unreported because publishers fear the ballooning cost and
disruption of defending a defamation action.”).
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communications media. For this reason, it is more accurate to
refer to the new defence as responsible communication on matters
of public interest.77

The need to adjust the standard of responsibility to
reflect the conditions of ordinary consumers is legally
possible. The jury is allowed to exercise discretion in
determining whether the communication was responsibly
made, as the factors set out in Grant are not exhaustive but
instead illustrative and flexible.78 The jury, for instance,
could consider new factors in assessing a consumer’s
diligence and assign them superior value.
It is thus hoped that in applying the new defense of
‘responsible communication on matters of public interest’
the courts develop a standard of diligence that is suitable
for ordinary consumers and provides reasonable protection
to consumer expression. This is extremely important
because it will avoid both reinstating the chilling effects on
expression and reinforcing consumerism, consumer apathy,
and bias against potentially active non-affluent citizens.
II. CONSUMER COUNTER-ADVERTISING LAW AND CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Despite the efforts of the courts to minimize the chilling
effects of the common law of defamation, there is still the
danger that consumer counter-advertising may not receive
favorable legal treatment in Canada. The fair comment
defense is still a high and costly standard to meet and is
likely to be ineffective. The defense of ‘responsible
communication on matters of public interest’ is significant
progress in the right direction, but it is possible that its
application will chill consumer expression. The lack of antiSLAPP legislation in Canada worsens the under-protection
of consumer counter-advertising. This legal framework
contrasts with the over-protection of corporate freedom of
expression in the form of commercial advertising. Unlike
consumer
and
governmental
counter-advertising,
commercial
advertising
has
strong
constitutional

77. Grant, at para. 97 (QUICKLAW).
78. Id. at paras. 122-23, 128.
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protection79 and corporations’ legal rights to bring actions
for consumer defamation are clearly established. In this
context, the uncertain protection of consumers’ freedom of
expression appears to affirm a structure of legal rights and
legal powers that favors corporate control of consumer
information and commercial advertising.
Thus, a flexible application of the standard of
responsibility in the area of consumer expression is much
needed. Such orientation of the application of the
responsible communication defense will encourage
consumers to express their opinions and criticisms about a
product, service, or corporate behavior without a serious
fear of a defamation suit.80 While the decision of consumers
to express their views and become active in the marketplace
depends on a number of behavioral and social factors, a
flexible application of the defense will create positive
institutional incentives for greater consumer expression.
Such an ideal outcome is likely to contribute to the
improvement of the welfare impact of the market as well as
the mitigation of the democratic deficit in the governance of
the economic system. It is obvious that consumer counteradvertising increases the availability of alternative
information and helps mitigate important market failures,
notably imperfect information and monopoly power. As a
result, consumers may be in a better position to freely
think, reflect, and make informed choices to stimulate
greater competition among corporations that will ultimately
enhance social welfare. Similarly, consumer counteradvertising also fosters the exchange of ideas in the
marketplace and in public debate. Consumer counteradvertising provides additional information to consumers,
the government, and corporations, and presents alternative
79. Since 1982, when the Charter came into effect, the Supreme Court of
Canada has detailed the extent of this constitutional protection in several
important cases. See R. v Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 482-85 (Can.); RJRMacDonald Inc. v. Can. (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 326 (Can.);
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 241
(Can.); Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 967
(Can.); Ford v. Quebec [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 764-67 (Can.). The constitutional
protection of commercial expression in Canada, however, is controversial and
has been questioned from different perspectives. See, e.g., ROGER A. SHINER.
FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION (2004).
80. Eugénie Brouillet, Free Speech, Reputation, and the Canadian Balance,
50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 33, 54 (2005).
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views of market consumption and consumer choices. This
enriches public debate and enhances the freedom of
expression of consumers, citizens, and the democratic
system at large. This advantage of consumer counteradvertising to further democratize the market is extremely
important. It helps correct the imbalances and biases that
result from corporate advertising; expensive marketing
campaigns often convey a one-sided view that is intended to
persuade rather than inform, and tends to monopolize the
discourses of market choices.81
More specifically, increasing consumer counteradvertising practices following a favorable application of the
defense is likely to revitalize an important social control
mechanism of corporate activity. Heightened consumer
counter-advertising not only increases the availability of
non-corporate information and the degree of democratic
deliberation in the marketplace, but it also strengthens an
important oversight mechanism, namely, consumers’
supervision of corporate activity through counteradvertising.82 Consumers can use their freedom of
expression to criticize corporate activity and demand
changes in the marketplace. The public interest
requirement of the responsible communication defense
should encompass those issues and bring them under the
protection of the defense. Indeed, in Grant, the Supreme
Court suggested that “public interest is not confined to
publications on government and political matters . . . , nor is
it necessary that the plaintiff be a public figure.”83 Free
expression “allows a person to speak not only for the sake of
expression itself, but also to advocate change, attempting to
persuade others in the hope of improving one’s life and
perhaps the wider social, political, and economic
81. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Can. (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199
(Can.); Boehringer Ingelheim (Can.) Ltd. v. Pharmacia Can. Inc., 00-CV-201798,
[2001] O.J. 1911 QUICKLAW, at para. 81 (O.S.C.J. May 22, 2001); Purolator
Courier Ltd. v. United Parcel Ser. Can. Ltd., 94-CU-81492, [1995] O.J. 876
QUICKLAW, at para. 62 (Ont. Gen. Div. Apr. 3, 1995).
82. See generally Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330
F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (involving Suzuki’s litigation against Consumer
Reports for publishing a report regarding Suzuki’s roll-over statistics); Kasky v.
Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)
(involving litigation against Nike in light of media reports critical of Nike’s labor
practices).
83. Grant, at para. 106 (QUICKLAW).
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environment.”84 Thus, stronger legal protection of consumer
counter-advertising as a form of freedom of expression
promotes consumer expression, which in turn encourages
corporate
accountability
and
corporate
social
responsibility.85
It is important to note, however, that the effectiveness
of such defense to further democratic governance, the
search for the truth and, specifically, corporate social
responsibility in the marketplace largely depends on the
presence of active consumers. In particular, consumer
associations may be more active in expressing concerns and
disseminating information. A public interest defense
provides the ideal legal protection to consumer associations
seeking to communicate critical messages about consumer
products and corporate behavior. Yet the number of
consumer associations in Canada is not impressive.
Furthermore, the recognition of consumer apathy indicates
that, at the individual level, consumers are not necessarily
interested in expressing opinions. In sum, the defense does
not necessarily encounter a favorable institutional
environment to actually promote democracy, truth, and
social responsibility in the marketplace. Outside the area of
freedom of expression and defamation, it is socially
desirable to build an institutional framework to encourage
consumer activism and the formation of consumer
associations if we want to experience the value of freedom of
expression via the responsible communication defense in
the marketplace.
A. Consumer Counter-Advertising, Obesity and Healthy
Eating
The social value of a lenient application of the
responsible communication defense to consumer expression
can be illustrated in the area of food consumption and
healthy eating. The presence of consumer counteradvertising contributes to the expansion of the legal and
84. R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Can. Beverages (W.) Ltd., [2002] 1
S.C.R. 156, 172, 2002 SCC 8 (Can.).
85. See Brenden E. Kendall et al., Consumer Activism and Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 241, 248
(Steve May et al. eds., 2007).
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social controls over aggressive food advertising and growing
corporate self-regulation of food advertising, which are often
unconcerned with healthy eating.86 Consumer counteradvertising could provide not only greater food information,
but also could supervise potentially misleading food
advertising, help reconstruct social ideas of public health
and nutrition,87 and improve the social responsibility of
corporations. For instance, in 2001, Coca-Cola “withdrew
from its nationwide network of exclusive school vending
contracts under pressure from consumer advocacy groups
concerned about the dramatic rise in childhood obesity.”88
These kinds of consumer practices may contribute to the
fight against obesity and hunger in Canada, problems that
are reaching critical proportions, jeopardizing the health of
Canadians, and depleting the public funding of the health
system.89 Both the democratic regulation of advertising and
the fight against obesity may benefit from stronger legal
protection of consumer expression.
Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, a decision also
known as the “McLibel” case, offers a good example of the
potential of consumers’ expression to enhance corporate
social responsibility in the area of food consumption.90 The
“McLibel” case began when McDonald’s sued two
impecunious members of London Greenpeace for libel
because of their distribution of leaflets that protested a
number of McDonald’s business practices, primarily related
to environmental impact, labor practices, and nutrition.91
Helen Steel and David Morris refused to apologize and
86. See, e.g., Raine, supra note 18, at S11.
87. Lawrence O. Gostin, Law as a Tool to Facilitate Healthier Lifestyles and
Prevent Obesity, 297 JAMA 87, 89 (2007) (arguing that counter-advertising can
promote good nutrition and physical activity); Note, The Elephant in the Room:
Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counteradvertising in the Coming War Against
Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1161-62 (2003); see also Consumer Justice Ctr.
v. Trimedica Int’l., Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 193, 195-97 (Ct. App. 2003).
88. Trenton G. Smith, The McDonald’s Equilibrium: Advertising, Empty
Calories, and the Endogenous Determination of Dietary Preferences, 23 SOC.
CHOICE WELFARE 383, 407-08 (2004).
89. STANDING COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, 39TH PARLIAMENT, 1ST SESS., HEALTHY
WEIGHTS FOR HEALTHY KIDS, at 1-3 (Can. House of Commons 2007),
http://www.ccfn.ca/pdfs/HealthyWeightsForHealthyKids.pdf.
90. Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
91. Id. at 9, 13.
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McDonald’s decided to sue them.92 Steel and Morris were too
poor to hire lawyers, and were clearly not economic
competitors of McDonald’s.93 Part of the criticism of the fast
food company contained in the pamphlets included the
following statements:
What’s so unhealthy about McDonald’s food?
McDONALD’s try [sic] to show in their ‘Nutrition Guide’ (which
is full of impressive-looking but really quite irrelevant facts and
figures) that mass-produced hamburgers, chips, colas and
milkshakes, etc., are a useful and nutritious part of any diet.
What they don’t make clear is that a diet high in fat, sugar,
animal products and salt (sodium), and low in fibre, vitamins and
minerals – which describes an average McDonald’s meal – is
linked with cancers of the breast and bowel, and heart disease.
This is accepted medical fact, not a cranky theory. Every year in
Britain, heart disease alone causes about 18,000 deaths.94

On appeal from the United Kingdom’s courts, the
European Court of Human Rights held that the lack of
government aid to consumers to prove the accuracy of their
criticism against a corporation is a violation of the human
right to freedom of expression as set forth in Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights.95 The court
stated that “[i]n conclusion, given the lack of procedural
fairness and the disproportionate award of damages, the
Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 10 . . .
.”96 It thus became obvious for the court that Steel and
Morris were at a disadvantage to defend their allegations
and definitively had no matching resources of the kind that
McDonald’s has to promote and enforce its version of
truth.97
One important social impact of this case is that it
attracted negative publicity, much of which focused on

92. Id. at 13-14.
93. Id. at 14.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 38-39.
96. Id. at 39.
97. Id. at 32.
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issues of corporate social responsibility.98 Consumer
expression, as exemplified in the activism of Steel and
Morris, raised concerns about a number of food issues and
exposed McDonald’s business practices to public scrutiny. It
is not difficult to imagine that a large number of consumers
read Steel and Morris’ complaints and re-examined both
their decisions to eat at McDonald’s and the nutritional
value of fast food. At the same time, the fast food industry
was called into question as to whether it really contributes
to enhancing nutrition and healthy eating in society. It is
conceivable that McDonald’s gave serious consideration to
the need to re-assess its business practices, its corporate
social responsibility policies, and the nutritional value of its
food options. Consumer expression and counter-advertising
thus turned into an oversight mechanism of corporate
activity, improving public accountability of the fast food
industry and contributing to the promotion of healthy
eating.
CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed the legal protection of
consumers’ freedom of expression as a form of counteradvertising, and has explored its implications for enhancing
corporate social responsibility in Canada. Courts have
traditionally favored the protection of reputation over
expression by setting stringent standards for the use of
defenses against defamation suits. This has chilled
consumers’ expression, counter-advertising practices, and,
more generally, consumer activism, which are already
under-protected as Canada lacks anti-SLAPP legislation. In
late 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada introduced a new
defense against defamation suits, namely, ‘responsible
communication on matters of public interest,’ which
represented major progress towards reducing the chilling
effects of the common law of defamation. The defense
requires that the communication must be on a matter of
public interest and be made responsibly. It was argued that,
when applied to consumers’ expression, there is still the
danger that the standard of diligence the new defense
requires may be too high for ordinary consumers and small
98. Douglas W. Vick & Kevin Campbell, Public Protests, Private Lawsuits, and the
Market: The Investor Response to the McLibel Case, 28 J. L. & SOC’Y 204, 234 n.100
(2001).
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consumer groups, thereby reinstating the chilling effects on
expression and reinforcing consumerism, consumer apathy,
and bias against potentially active non-affluent citizens. It
is desirable that the application of such a standard is
responsive to the real conditions of ordinary consumers.
A flexible application of the new defense is important
because it will encourage consumer expression and counteradvertising that may become an oversight mechanism,
namely, consumers’ supervision of corporate activity
through counter-advertising. This may in turn enhance
corporate social responsibility. In the area of food
consumption and healthy eating, the presence of consumer
counter-advertising will probably improve the level of legal
and social control over aggressive food advertising and
growing corporate self-regulation of food advertising, which
is often unconcerned with healthy eating.
Further research is needed in several respects. For
instance, it is important to give fresh consideration to the
need to reinstate anti-SLAPP legislation in Canada, and
assess its significance in light of the recently introduced
defense of ‘responsible communication on matters of public
interest.’

